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meaning the size of the economy, the
size of the opportunity, you can add
up everything else in Asia, including
China, and it is about 60% of Japan’s
GDP. Certainly, if you take Japan and
China as a total and look at the rest,
it is inconsequential. That is a dramatic
statement, and I cannot tell you that
we have completely shied away from
everything else, but this is how we
spend our time. This is why Tim
Collins and Lou Forster and many of
the players that we compete against
have focused so much of their time
on Japan. It is where the action is. 
Japan has a big real estate problem.
Prices and rents are probably down
70%–80% from the bubble in the
early 1990s. One of the things that
still always surprises people when
they come to Tokyo, is that this is a
country that has been in a recession/
depression for 12 years, and yet
there are cranes up all over the
place. In every direction you look,
there is new office construction
going on. 
This is a function of a couple of
things. One, land prices are low. 
The cost to add new inventory to the
market is a fraction of what it used to
be. If you are a developer and you
have to build to stay alive, you can
easily rationalize that decision. 
Two, in the late 1990s, there were
actually many reasons for hope.
People built very big projects
because multinationals wanted a lot
of space, especially in the IT (infor-
mation technology) sector, but also 
in the financial services sector. 
The hard thing about real estate is
that if you are a developer, you are
trying to time companies’ real-time
decisions and yet you have a three-
to five-year lead time on actually 
putting a product into the market. 
It is a terrible dynamic to be in, and
to do well requires a lot of luck. 
It is hard to generalize, as China is
such a large country, but generally,
the real estate fundamentals in China
are okay. There are definitely some
cities where you have oversupply,
especially in the residential sector,
but Shanghai, which was relatively
spared the tough consequences of
SARS, continues to grow very aggres-
sively. Residential prices are up;
office rents are up; vacancy continues
to come down. 
That creates an opportunity and, from
our standpoint, we say, “We like the
real estate fundamentals. We think
there is a lot of distress. How do we
take advantage of finding a distressed
opportunity so that we can buy at an
attractive price and then ride that
curve?” It is definitely easier said than
done, but that is what we get paid for.
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The Scope of the Market in 
East Asia
I can tell you, as someone who has
been going back and forth to China
for the last seven or eight years, the
growth that you hear about there is
real. I remember going to Shanghai
in the early or mid-1990s and Pudong,
one of the major districts of China,
was basically farmland. Now, there is
more than 50 million square feet of
office space there, most of which has
been built in the last five years.  
Goldman Sachs put out a report about
a year ago saying that they thought
the 8% growth was understated by the
Chinese because they were afraid that
people would not believe it if they
reported the real growth. I believe
that. I believe that the growth on the
coast in China, in Shanghai, in Beijing,
in Guangzhou is probably closer to
12%–15% per annum. 
Is that sustainable? Who knows?
Many people are talking about a
slowdown in the next 6 to 12
months, but a slowdown in China is
probably 4%–5% growth. For our
business, being a bit counter-cyclical,
in several places where you have 
this kind of growth, there would not
be opportunities for us. 
The good news, if you are a distressed
investor, is that China has a US$500
billion bad loan problem in their
banking system. It is not as big as
Japan’s, but it is pretty big and it is 
a pretty big opportunity. 
Many of the people who have spoken
to you have talked to you about
what they are doing in some different
markets such as South Korea or
Taiwan, for example, but you could
argue that the rest of Asia outside of
Japan really does not matter. If you
think about it from a GDP perspective,
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“The hard thing about real estate is that if you are a developer,
you are trying to time companies’ real-time decisions and yet
you have a three- to five-year lead time on actually putting a
product into the market. It is a terrible dynamic to be in, and
to do well requires a lot of luck.”
To put that in context, the worst the
United States ever got at the height
of the RTC (Resolution and Trust
Corporation) problem in the early
1990s was US$250 billion, which
amounted to approximately 2.5%–3%
of the U.S. economy, maybe 5% in
the maximum case. In Japan, even if
it is a trillion dollar problem, that is
25% of the annual GDP, so it is a big
problem. To further put that into
context, China—at US$500 billion—
reaches 50% of China’s annual GDP,
but at least China’s GDP is going in
the right direction. There is still a
great deal of aggressive action that
needs to happen in Japan. 
Resona Bank, which was the fifth
largest banking group in Japan, 
was nationalized this past spring,
although the government is not really
calling it nationalization; they are
calling it an equity investment. That
is sending a very strong message to
the financial community. The other
banks are very focused. When the
government puts money in, what it
means is that management has to
take the responsibility to resign and
then the government puts the FSA
(Financial Supervisory Agency) in to
basically rewrite those loan portfolios
to market, and that causes a huge
ripple effect. 
What the Japanese banks have been
able to do thus far is ignore the
problem by basically saying, “Look,
this borrower is continuing to pay
interest on their loan.” In a low inter-
est rate environment, many people
can pay interest on their loans. In the
United States, the notion of the ability
to repay the principal is a critical 
criterion in determining whether a
loan is non-performing, sub-performing
or not. In Japan, it is not. If big
condo developer “ABC” can get by
because they have a 50 basis point
or 1% interest rate on their debt 
and they can make that payment 
on a regular basis, even if there is 
no chance they are ever going to 
be able to repay their debt, banks
can generally carry that as a perform-
ing loan. 
When Resona Bank blows up and
the FSA comes in and they hire an
accounting firm to scrub down the
loan portfolio and it says, “Hey, if
you do a net present value analysis
on this thing, this paper is only
worth 50 cents on the dollar,” and
Resona has to write that down to
market, guess what? The rest of the
banks’ auditors, at some point, are
going to make them write that down.
The last time that happened in size
was when LTCB was nationalized
(Ripplewood ended up buying it and
it is now Shinsei Bank). If you want
to narrowly define it from our per-
spective, that creates a big buying
opportunity because when these
banks have to write this stuff down,
they generally will get rid of it.
From a more macro standpoint, it is
a very simple problem to understand;
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Opportunity and Strategy: 
China, Japan, and Korea
In terms of the focus of our business,
our strategy, it is really simple. We
spend 80% of our time and energy
on Japan, and it is very comprehen-
sive. A third of what we do is non-
performing loans (NPLs), about 60%
is real estate assets, and less than
10% is operating companies. We did
a lot in South Korea several years
ago. The activity has slowed down a
lot, but we still own 10 office build-
ings in the Central Business District
of Seoul. We would be interested in
doing more, but the Koreans are very
good business people and are usually
out ahead of us in terms of having
an optimistic view on the market. 
So, if things look a little bit good, 
to the Koreans, they look great. 
We need things to look a little bit
bad, because when they look a little
bit bad, the Koreans think it is terri-
ble. We just have to wait for the next
buying opportunity. Unfortunately,
we bought six office buildings in 
the two months after September 11,
2001. A big part of our business is
just taking the contrarian bet on 
sentiment, on what the conventional
wisdom is, and just loading up and
going the other way. 
China is, for lack of a better term, 
a scary place to do business. My
investors are always pointing to the
rule of law and the legal system and
asking, “How does this all work; how
have you gotten comfortable with it?”
The usual answer is, “Well, we’re still
working on some of it.” I would add
that, given the scale of our fund,
which is a global fund with US$3 bil-
lion of equity, you leverage that up
and it is US$15 billion worth of buy-
ing power. It is a big fund, so to put
US$500 million into China may seem
like a lot of money. I know that it is
a lot of money, but it is 5% of our
fund. That is the approach we are
taking; we are putting a toe in the
water—we happen to have a really
big foot, so our toe is pretty big.
From the standpoint of getting in
over our knees, we are not going 
to do that until we have a higher
degree of comfort that China is a
place where we can make money.
Most of what we have been buying
are NPLs, so we can buy these loans,
pursue our creditor rights, get our
money back, and then actually get 
it out of the country. We are still in
the process of doing all of that.
With regard to the macroeconomics
of what is going on in Japan, I am
going to focus on what it is that
impacts our business. One, there
were a series of LDP (Liberal
Democratic Party) elections about a
month ago, and, in our view, there
was a very favorable outcome.
Koizumi won by a big margin. In
most people’s view, he had a man-
date to do what he wanted to do; he
reshuffled his cabinet. Many were
outsiders to politics and this reaf-
firmed his stance as a reformer. I am
not Japanese, but having lived there
for six years, and having followed
politics for even longer than that, 
it is pretty remarkable. It is the 
closest thing, I think, Japan has 
probably had to grassroots change 
in a long time. 
The financial institutions are probably
in better shape today than they 
were five years ago. That is a relative
statement; they still have, by some
estimates, US$1 trillion of NPLs, 
and some estimates are a trillion 
and a half. 
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“We spend 80% of our time and energy on Japan, and it is very comprehensive.”
1.5%–2%. You look really smart, as
long as things work out, if you can
buy something for 100 that has a 6%
or 7% current yield and finance 80%
of it at 2%. That is a great cash-on-
cash equity yield, and, in fact, we
have had a number of assets that we
have bought on that basis, held for
three years, sold for what we have
bought them for, but because we
made such a big cash-on-cash equity
yield, we did very well. The targeted
IRRs (internal rates of return) are
20%, plus leveraged internal rates 
of return. You can do that, but it is 
a tricky business. It is the reason 
we have a team as big as this.
What are the bright spots in the
property market? One is definitely
the J-REITs (a derivative of the 
U.S. REITs: simplistically put, it is the
public equity securitization of real
estate). These are tax-efficient vehi-
cles here in the United States and
they are definitely tax efficient in
Japan as well. They got off to a slow
start because the first two J-REITs 
listed soon after September 12, 2001.
As you can imagine, that was not the
best time to be going into the equity
markets anywhere in the world, for
anything, but they have outperformed
not only the broader real estate index,
but also the overall stock market. 
Why? Because you can get a 5% to
7% dividend yield in a country where
the average dividend yield in the
Nikkei is less than 20 basis points; 
so it is a very attractive current yield. 
Because these are all new vehicles
and have to have new appraisals
done on a Western discounted cash-
flow basis, there is a view that these
assets are being marked down to
market when they are then being
sold into the market. There is also
definitely a lot more transparency
than there has been historically,
which is also why these companies
have done so well. I fundamentally
believe that this business is going to
take off. 
In 1998, there had never been a non-
recourse loan made to finance real
estate in Japan. That has changed
significantly and the CMBS (commer-
cial mortgage-backed securities) mar-
ket has grown consistently over the
last five years. 
Compare and contrast China and
Japan. Japan is a lot less scary; it has
a legal system that works, a rule of
law; there is case precedent; there is
real estate; you can buy it on a fee-
simple basis; you can foreclose on a
borrower; you know how the court
process works. That is the good
news. The bad news is that Japan
has been in 12 or 13 years of reces-
sion. There are definitely liquidity
issues in a number of places outside
the major cities. Frankly, even though
Koizumi and the government are
doing a much better job now, there
is still a fundamental lack of clarity
on how the problem will get resolved.
China has very strong direction.
There is a huge commitment to 
getting the NPL problem sorted out. 
I think they are still trying to figure
out what they need to do and 
everyone looks for the soft landing
approach, but there is a much higher
degree of commitment. They also
have an economy that is growing.
Japan talks about inflating their way
out of their debt problem, but China
could actually do it, if they wanted
to. It would create many issues, but
they could theoretically do it. 
The biggest issue there is the rule of
law. The precedents that you would
need to get comfortable as an investor
just do not exist. That is why there
has been only one NPL portfolio that
has sold in China that has closed. 
We did it. It is not a huge investment,
but let us just say it causes a dispro-
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it is a very difficult problem to
address. If you have a hole that is
25% of GDP, a hole that big in your
banking system, how do you address
it? They set up this entity called the
Industrial Revitalization Corporation
of Japan (IRCJ). Its mandate is very
simple. It is supposed to use govern-
ment money to help restructure 
companies with the involvement 
of the private sector. 
It sounds interesting, like something
that could possibly work, but it has
not worked thus far; and the main
reason for that is that it has not been
transparent, and the IRCJ does not
have the ability to force the banks 
to do anything with any individual
borrower that they are trying to
restructure. It is an interesting idea,
though. I think it is something that is
going to gain momentum over time.
It is something that Koizumi, once he
gets through the general elections in
November, will be able to push more
aggressively. Keep the IRCJ’s name 
in the back of your head: I think it is
going to be a bigger factor.
Looking at demand in the real estate
sector, obviously anything that is
negative is a really bad thing. Supply
has been very significant in the last
few years. In Tokyo, office supply
has significantly outstripped demand.
Vacancy rates in Tokyo have gone
from 1% or 2% to 7% or 8% now,
and they will probably go close to
10%. Now, 10% on a global basis is
not that bad. I think New York City 
is probably at about 20% vacancy
right now. For a market that was at
1% or 2% just three years ago, how-
ever, it is very significant. It has had
a very significant impact on rents,
which creates a buying opportunity,
to take the optimistic perspective.
One question I am always asked by
investors is, “If you have a market
like this, how do you make money
in it? If you are buying distressed
assets, how do you make money in 
a deflationary environment?” The
answer is, “It is hard.” One thing that
is absolutely critical is that you have
to have pricing power; you have to
have the ability to buy assets at a
price that is below what the clearing
price is on a retail basis in the mar-
ket. Anyone who has invested in dis-
tressed real estate in Japan, or in any
real estate, and bought at anything
close to market price has lost money;
they have either monetized that loss
or are sitting on a loss on their books.
So, first you have to find unique situ-
ations where you can buy assets on
an off-market basis. You have to look
for complicated situations, where you
buy a company, for example, you
strip it apart, you pull the assets out
of it, and because you are buying the
entire package (and if you are willing
to put up with the difficulties associ-
ated with stripping the assets out of
it), you can get better pricing. 
Second, you must have the ability to
add value. We have 150 people on
our real estate team in Japan; 120 of
them manage real estate assets or
work out NPLs, so it is a very hands-
on, labor-intensive business. We have
to take the view that we have the
ability to outperform. We can buy an
asset that has been under-managed.
The owner has been distressed, been
in bankruptcy; the building is 50%
vacant because they have not had
the money to spend to bring the 
tenants in. That is definitely another
part of our thesis. 
A third part is to borrow as much
money as you can possibly borrow.
That is probably the scariest part of
the thesis. It is not uncommon for 
us to be able to borrow 80% or 90%
of our purchase price on anything
we buy at interest rates of about
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“You have to have pricing
power; you have to have the
ability to buy assets at a
price that is below what the
clearing price is on a retail
basis in the market.”
“Japan talks about inflat-
ing their way out of their
debt problem, but China
could actually do it, if they
wanted to.”
Questions and Answers:
Q: Among the NPL portfolios that
you have invested in, which asset
classes have monetized more quickly
than others? 
Kalsi: Fundamentally, Japan is a
deflationary place. This is not going
to change for some time. The pace
of deflation has slowed down, but 
it has also shifted a bit. Anything
that we own outside of Tokyo 
and Osaka is pretty troubling. The
regional markets in Japan are getting
further and further gutted. There are
many cities in Japan with a popula-
tion of 500,000–1,000,000 people
that have no reason to exist at all.
There is no indigenous industry.
There may be a heavily subsidized
rice farming business, but these
cities are in a lot of trouble. Any-
thing we have held in Osaka or
Tokyo has been a better investment.
Yields have held up better; capital
values have held up better and 
been more liquid.
Our average hold period on a real
estate position has been 18 to 24
months. If you are in a deflationary
environment and you are holding
long term, you are just losing
money; your assets are worth less
every day you wake up. The chal-
lenge is to get in there, add the
value you are going to add, and get
out. In the regional markets, there 
is much less of a bid in the market,
so there is less liquidity and the real
estate fundamentals are much worse.
Q: How did you structure your first
deal in China in order to deal with
the legal and currency issues? 
Kalsi: We made our bid subject 
to 10 or 12 things, which included
getting comfort on taxes, holding
structure, ability to actually own the
loans and own the real estate if we
decided to credit-bid an asset and
actually take the real estate back,
and then also the ability to repay
trade money. The deal took 15
months to get approved. In fact, 
I think all of my competitors owe 
us something because we spent 
millions of dollars in legal fees and
worked with the Chinese govern-
ment and six different state agencies
to put the enabling legislation in
place to get all this done. The good
news is, it is all there on paper and
we have run everything through 
the system once and it has worked.
I would say the issue—I will not call
it bad news, as it is still in its early
days—is that we have sold 7% of
that portfolio, so we still have 93%
to go.
Q: Are you allowed to service your
own loans [in China] or does the
government still control that? How
does that differ from Japan? Also,
how close are the Japanese to getting
the idea of selling close to market?
Kalsi: On the servicing side, techni-
cally, you are not allowed to service
assets in China. That was another
thing that we made our bid subject
to—we have 45 people in Beijing in
our servicing company, which is
approved to service the portfolio that
we own. We have to go back and 
get further approval to do any other
portfolio; we have to get re-licensed
for any other portfolio that we want
to buy. From a licensing standpoint,
Japan is actually really straightforward.
The Ministry of Justice regulates 
servicing, which is interesting
because it is not the Ministry of
Finance, it is the Ministry of Justice—
that tells you a little something about
what they think about the servicing
business. We have 120 people in 
our servicing there; and there are
probably 40 or 50 licensed servicers
in Japan, and there are actually very
few restrictions on what you can do
from a servicing standpoint once you
have a licensed servicer. 
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portionate amount of my staying awake
at night. I am proud to say that we
got our first distribution of capital 
out of there. We were able to pursue
the borrowers. We got their money;
we were able to “run it through the
plumbing,” as they call it, pay the
taxes that they told us we were going
to have to pay, and then convert ren-
minbi to U.S. dollars and ship them
out of the country. We did it the first
time. I will be a lot more comfortable
when it is five years from now and
we are able to do a lot of that.
Some more detail on the size of the
problem: There are four big state
banks that have four asset manage-
ment companies (AMCs) attached to
them. These AMCs are the govern-
ment’s vehicle for pumping the assets
through the system and trying to get
them to liquidate. The problem has
been that on the one hand they are
told, “Clear these assets out,” but on
the other hand told, “You can’t take
less than 30 cents on the dollar.”
They have not been given the ability
to set a market-clearing price to sell
these assets out. 
Bill Siedman, who first chaired the
U.S. Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC), tells a story of how, for the
first year the RTC was in existence
here in the United States, it could not
do it either. His hands were tied and
he went back to Congress and said,
“Look, if I can’t sell this stuff for fair
market value, it is not going to work,”
and they gave him the ability to do
that. Three years later, he had mone-
tized everything. 
The Chinese are still figuring that part
out. They are getting there slowly.
I will say, without giving any inside
information away, that we paid sub-
stantially less than 30 cents on the
dollar in the portfolio we bought. 
South Korea, in many ways, has the
best risk-reward profile of the critical
distressed markets in Asia. It has
some of the positives that Japan 
has in terms of the legal system and
the rule of law, but on the flip side,
it has an economy that is in better
shape than Japan’s. There are defi-
nitely some issues in Korea that I
view as short term. 
One of them has to do with Kim
Jong-il, which I think creates an
overhang in the market. The other 
is that there is a huge consumer debt
problem. The average Korean had
eight credit cards three or four years
ago, but now the average Korean has
five credit cards. If you take just that
one data point, that tells you that
there is a bubble there that is in the
process of getting burst. The good
news is that the average person has
US$8,000 of credit card debt, so it 
is not completely out of control,
although the GDP per capita is about
US$8,000 or US$9,000 as well. It is
not something that is going to tank
the economy, but it is definitely
something that is getting sorted out,
and that and SARS are part of the
reason you see negative growth in
the first three quarters of this year.
Again, we hope it causes a buying
opportunity, but it has not yet.
Institutional sellers have not gotten
too panicked about it yet.
To sum up our business, there are
four components. One is the real
estate advisory business, which is
raising equity capital through J-REITs
for clients, or providing M&A advice.
The second is we are also the largest
foreign, non-recourse lender in Japan
to real estate. We have an aggressive
loan position there. Third, we also
have the MSREF program, which is
our real estate fund, which again,
from a focused standpoint, is about
60%–70% of what we have done.
Finally, there is asset management,
which is managing the assets that we
own together with some third-party
assets.
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“We are the largest foreign,
non-recourse lender in
Japan to real estate. We
have an aggressive loan
position there.”
“Fundamentally, Japan is 
a deflationary place. This
is not going to change for
some time.” 
do that. My view on real estate is
really simple. I never get excited
about anything I buy until the day 
I sell it. How does that break down
across countries? Surprisingly, for 
different reasons, we do not have a
very different view in terms of what
our return expectations are. Our view
is that we are actually focused on
setting the cash-flow stream, if you
will, or underwriting cash-flow
stream, which reflects what we think
the risk is in the market, then using 
a more standard discount rate to
bring it back. That being said, we 
are probably a few hundred basis
points wider in China. We are proba-
bly prepared to be a few hundred
basis points tighter in Korea. Japan is
probably close to twenty. Thus far,
we have been able to hit it and even
exceed it in Japan, which is purely a
function of financing. 
Regarding Shui-on, we have only
made two hard asset investments into
mainland China, one of which is a
development project, which we are
doing with the Shanghai municipal
government; so this is typical in
China. Shui-on, which is a big Hong
Kong–based construction concern,
comes in, builds this huge project in
the middle of Shanghai, and spends a
lot of money on infrastructure. They
are in the middle of a 10-year devel-
opment plan. Then, the municipal
government comes in and already
controls the parcels around the site,
and then gets the benefit of all the
infrastructure and everything else that
has gone in, without having to pay
for it; and they then undercut the
market in terms of pricing the units. 
Q: My understanding is that the
Japanese distressed market opportu-
nity has been around and firms have
been participating in it for five to
seven years. How have the returns
varied over time?
Kalsi: For the most part they have
been pretty consistent. In the early
days, absolute returns were higher.
There was more risk, more uncertainty
in the market; people did not have
experience; they did not have 150-
person teams on the ground. On the
flip side, they also could not borrow
a lot of money, or any money! They
were getting 20%–25% returns on an
unlevered basis. Now, those unlev-
ered returns are probably closer to
8%–10%, but on a leveraged basis
they are still in the 20% range. There
probably was a brief period of time
when things were a little wider than
that, but it was short lived and the
Japanese did not sell a whole lot.
That is when everyone showed up. 
Q: Assuming the Japanese GDP will
move up a good bit, to the 2% or 3%
range for the next two or three years,
do you anticipate a bottoming of the
national land prices within a year or
two? 
Kalsi: I hope so, but I am not going
to bank on it. I think most market
watchers have been surprised by
how the market has been able to
absorb this new space. There are a
couple of different things going on.
Vacancy rates have gone up fivefold,
if you look at it on a relative basis.
They have gone from 2% to 10%. On
an absolute basis, maybe it is not as
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On your second question, where 
are the Japanese on market-clearing
prices? The individual institutions are
more or less there. There is a differ-
ence, though, between their ability to
accept a market-clearing price and
their realization that they would have
to sell at a market-clearing price. 
We have bought a large pool of
assets there and mind you, at least
when we bought all of them, they
were marked to market. We think
that there has been US$20 billion to
$25 billion worth of assets that have
traded, and presumably, Goldman
Sachs, Lonestar, Ripplewood,
Cerberus, and Lehmann Brothers are
also buying access at a market-clearing
price. They get it. You need one or
two things to happen. You are a
bank in Japan and you have a loan
book that is worth 50 cents on the
dollar, so, you need to come up with
capital. You can do it in a couple of
ways. You can get someone to put
that capital in. In the spring of this
year, a number of Japanese banks
actually went to their borrowers and
basically said, “You’re a good bor-
rower. We’d love to keep extending
you credit. By the way, we know
you can’t repay your loan, so we’ll
keep rolling over your low-interest
rate loan, so that you don’t have to
go into default, but you need to buy
some stock in the bank.” They raised
US$18 billion doing that. You can do
that once and they did do that. 
Another way to get capital is to get 
a government injection, but that is
bad because then management is out
of work and banks get nationalized.
Finally, there is regulatory forbear-
ance. That is starting to happen more
and more. The IRCJ is an example of
how the government is trying to fill
the gap, one way or another. Some
combination of regulatory forbearance
and capital injection, both from a
public and a private standpoint, is
why it is going to be a 10-year issue.
The good news is that the Japanese
realize there is a problem and they
have a game plan in place, but the
bad news (or maybe the good news
from a business standpoint) is it is a
10-year issue.
Q: What sort of cash-on-cash IRRs
have you been achieving in the three
markets that you are operating in?
Also, the Shui-on Group in Hong
Kong has been trying to raise a big
chunk of capital for their Shanghai
development. What do you think of
that?
Kalsi: What we have told our limited
partner investors is that we will try 
to get 20% internal rates of return 
on their capital. From a bottom-line
perspective, we have been able to 
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“My view on real estate is really simple. I never get excited about anything
I buy until the day I sell it.”
Sonny Kalsi and members of the audience at the reception
As the business has grown slowly,
however, and now you have US$5
billion or US$6 billion in market capi-
tal, with the view that that is going to
double, then the institutional investor
can put a guy on the buy side, 
saying, “Please look at this sector;
think about putting capital into it.”
Likewise, if you are an underwriter,
you can say, “Let’s get our equity
research analysts to spend a little 
less time on some of the traditional
property companies and focus on the
J-REITs.” I think that whole combina-
tion of things is what is accelerating
things. When clients ask me what
they should expect from a listing
standpoint, I tell them that if they did
a J-REIT today, it is over US$500 mil-
lion in size. I think 50% to 60% we
sold institutionally right off the bat,
and that is a significant change. 
K-REITs are stillborn. Fundamentally,
the structure does not work. There
are many reasons why. They are
mostly mechanical; they should be
relatively easy to fix and address.
The Koreans, surprisingly, have not
been able to get their act together
between the National Tax Authority
(NTA) and the Ministry of Finance.
There are a couple of different 
government entities involved in 
regulating the K-REITs, and there are
still a number of conflicts between
them in terms of how these things
should work. 
K-REITs are not very tax efficient.
They do not allow for much flexibility
in terms of owning assets, and there-
fore, they cannot really offer a yield
that is attractive. That is why they
have been slow to grow; there are
only a handful of them. They have 
a micro-cap in terms of market cap.
However, I have been working with
the Koreans long enough to know
that they will figure that out, and
they know what the issues are and
need to get their political act together.
They will get it sorted out. 
The big issue there is that Japan is
such a huge economy and there is so
much foreign capital that comes into
Japan regularly that there is always a
bid in the market for yield. I am not
sure there is a bid in the market for
Won paper. The size of that market is
going to be limited because I do not
think there will be as much foreign
interest in the paper, and I do not
think the domestic market is big
enough to support a full-fledged
industry.
Q: You referred briefly to an interest
rate environment that you described
as “artificially low.” To the extent that
leverage is so crucial to you at this
point, how concerned are you about
a rise in interest rates, and what do
you see as the timing of any potential
rise in interest rates? 
Kalsi: I am not an economist, but
most economists’ views in Japan, 
at least, is that interest rates are not
going anywhere, anytime soon,
because they cannot. If you look at
spreads, they have clearly widened 
in Japan over the last year or so, on
a relative basis. Percentage-wise it is 
a lot, but on an absolute basis, it is
nothing. If you add 20 basis points 
to 20 basis points, you are doubling
it, but you are at 40 basis points. 
The Japanese cannot afford to raise
interest rates. 
Most people now believe that Japan
is stable enough, so there is very low
risk for a bond market blow-up that
would cause rates to spiral out of
control. As a buyer, we are probably
80% hedged, either through taking
fixed-rate financing or by buying
caps. That being said, our view is
that our investors do not want us 
to speculate on interest rates and 
currency, so we are fully hedged 
on currency and 80% protected on
interest rates. The bigger impact will
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bad as people thought it would be,
but on a relative basis, it has gone
up fivefold. Rents have probably
come down 20% from early 2001 to
now, if you look at Class “A” rents 
in Tokyo. Capital values have not
moved that much, which means that
people’s yield expectations have
come down. That is a function of a
couple of things. One, financing rates
are low and there is more financing
available. Two, the J-REITs are a nat-
ural buyer and accumulator of assets.
There are seven of them in existence
right now, with four more in registra-
tion. It is a $5 billion or $6 billion
market-cap business right now. I per-
sonally think it will be $12 billion to
$15 billion by the end of 2004. 
So, at the same time, while some of
the real estate fundamentals have
been difficult, there has actually been
more capital going into real estate,
both through the capital markets and
institutionally. The Japanese insur-
ance companies are now starting to
go back in and buy real estate again
in Tokyo, at least in good locations.
There are a number of government
pension funds. One of them has
US$80 billion, which is rolling over
in the next few years, and they want
to have a 10% allocation in real
estate, so that is US$88 billion that is
not in real estate right now. That has
kept prices firm. 
I still think that most of the Japanese
participants in the market believe
that the turnaround is a ways off. 
I also believe most of the foreign
investors believe that. Some of my
competitors are taking the “back-up-
the-truck-and-load-up-everything-you-
can” strategy, thinking they have the
ability to time the market here. If
they are right, they are going to do
really well. I think that is tough. Real
estate is a lagging index. There is
much more data on this in the
United States than there is in Japan.
In the United States, the real estate
market hits bottom 12 to 24 months
after the economy does. I would
argue that in Japan, it is pretty com-
parable to that, especially in an artifi-
cially low interest rate environment.
Q: You mentioned you expected a
lot of growth in J-REITs. Can you
shed a little more light on that and
also talk about K-REITs?
Kalsi: With the J-REITs, the first 
two had very bad timing in terms 
of when they listed, and I think,
between them, they had a market
cap of US$700 million or US$800
million. The first two that were 
listed were sold 70% or 80% 
domestic retail. The positive way 
of saying that is that Mom and 
Pop were looking for yield and 
they bought this. 
There have been many issues with
the way the J-REITs were set up.
They have external management,
which means it is hard to align 
the interests of the management
company and the asset-owning com-
pany. Here in the United States,
most of these REITs are internally
managed. It is the best way to 
align interests, in terms of fees 
and performance. 
What has changed is that the first
two have done okay, and therefore
more were incrementally added on
and people have listed. The other
thing that has changed is that the 
first two are now 70% or 80% held
institutionally. If you are an institu-
tion, the problem is that if there is 
a US$700 million or US$800 million
sector, it is not worth your time to
take one of your people, put them
on the desk, and say, “You’re going
to follow the J-REIT sector.” From 
the broker/dealer standpoint, it is 
not worth it to take one of your
research analysts and say, “Please
start research on the J-REITs.” 
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“While some of the real
estate fundamentals have
been difficult, there has
actually been more capital
going into real estate, both
through the capital mar-
kets and institutionally.”
“Our view is that our
investors do not want us to
speculate on interest rates
and currency, so we are
fully hedged on currency
and 80% protected on
interest rates.”
fundamentally changes from a 
market standpoint, I do not know.
Interestingly, there is going to be a
second auction at the end of this
year, and they still have not come
out with what we, as investors,
should be underwriting to in terms 
of what we can get. I think we will
get 80% or 90% of what we are able
to negotiate over a year and a half,
but I do not think we will get all of
it. Real estate, land, is still very dear
to the Chinese and certainly to the
government, and it is definitely a
way for them to control resources, 
so I do not see a fundamental, signif-
icant change in that any time soon.
Q: There are presumably Japanese
firms that are also doing business in
distressed real estate. Why are you
and other foreign firms doing so
much better? The impression is that
you are doing better—I do not know
whether that is true or not, but I
assume it is. What is your explana-
tion, aside from hubris, as to why
you are doing so much better?
Kalsi: Five years ago, there was not
one Japanese investor in distressed
assets. That market has grown signifi-
cantly. I would say that 10% or 20%
of the market now is probably
Japanese capital and that is growing.
I am not sure that we have necessarily
done better as it relates to the returns
that we have made. Certainly, we have
been prepared to take more risk. On
a risk-adjusted basis, I would say that
the intelligent Japanese capital that
has gone in has probably done just
as well as we have. They have prob-
ably taken less risk, and therefore,
their returns are lower. 
Part of the issue is: how do you go
out and raise capital or convince
your management to go along with
distressed business when you have 
a big distressed problem yourself?
From a mentality standpoint, it is
hard to get them to turn around. In
1991–92, Chase Manhattan Bank and
Bank of America were not buying
many distressed assets in the United
States. In turn, traditionally, the secu-
rities firms in Japan have always
been relatively reluctant to commit
large sums of capital to that business.
They have been much more in the
agency business than they have been
in the principal business. That means
it leaves it to entrepreneurs, to peo-
ple who are setting up smaller funds,
and I would say that the average size
of a foreign investor’s capital alloca-
tion, whether it is through a fund 
or through balance sheet, is several
billion dollars. The average Japanese
private equity fund, on the other
hand, is probably US$50 million to
$100 million. From a scale standpoint,
there is only so much they can do. 
I think that we (and other foreign
investors) ultimately will get priced
out of the distressed business in
Japan by local capital, well before
there is an economic recovery in
Japan. It is just an incremental chip-
ping away at our business. At the
better end of our business, the 
J-REITs are chipping away at it right
now. On the more distressed end 
of our business, these small funds 
are chipping away at our business.
That is part of the cycle. I started 
my career here in the United States,
spent some time in Europe, and got
priced out of those markets. We will
get priced out of the Japan market
eventually. Who knows what is next?
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not be on our financing cost; it will
be on a take-out in the market if
interest rates do go up 2%–3% over
time. It will have an impact on 
liquidity and it will definitely have 
an impact on real estate values,
although for that to happen, for inter-
est rates to go to 2% or 3%, Japan 
is going to have to be doing really
well. Smarter people than I have
done all sorts of statistical regression
analysis and game theory analysis to
show that if interest rates double in
Japan, then that means that GDP has
to be growing by 3%, and if that
happens, all this great stuff is going
to be happening. The reality is, who
knows? That is part of the reason,
from the reality standpoint, that our
average hold period has been shorter.
We are just not willing to go long on
real estate in Japan because there is
more downside than upside.
Q: Could you tell us a bit about
problems Morgan Stanley has had
putting capital to work in Japan in
distressed real estate? To what extent
is capital overhang a problem with
the industry overall, in the same way
it is with private equity?
Kalsi: Ironically, there is probably
more demand for distressed assets in
Japan than there is supply, which
does not make any sense. To over-
simplify it, someone has to write the
check, someone has to fill the gap
on the balance sheet for the Japanese
to be able to turn around and sell
the assets. That does not really exist
in size right now. Therefore, in any
given distress situation, there are def-
initely multiple capital parties that are
interested in them. It all comes down
to access. 
Everyone has a different strategy and
approach. Ripplewood has clearly
been focused on big operating busi-
nesses like LTCB and like some other
less distressed, more private equity
type turnaround opportunities.
Lonestar has also been very focused
on financial institutions. We have
been focused on more traditional real
estate opportunities, driven by our
corporate clients. One big competi-
tive advantage that we have is that
we have, by far, the biggest invest-
ment banking division within Japan.
We have a hundred investment
bankers that cover a couple of hun-
dred accounts with whom they have
very good relationships. I do not
think anyone has the track record
that we do of actually doing negotiated
transactions with our corporate
customers. There are not many 
people who can do that, who have
that scale of relationships, but who
also have the ability to commit large
amounts of money very quickly.
Q: You mentioned that in your first
and only Chinese deal so far, the
government granted you some very
important conditions that you negoti-
ated for, specifically, not only owner-
ship of the loans, but if foreclosed
upon, ownership of the real estate.
That is contrary to the current laws—
a distinct advantage. Do you think
that will remain a limited opportunity
for big players like yourself, or do
you think that this will eventually
trickle down and perhaps change
property ownership realities in China? 
Kalsi: No one owns land in China.
Everything is done on a land-use
right basis, and there are two types
of land-use rights: allocated and
granted. It is very complicated, but
with a granted land-use right, you
can do whatever you basically want
with it subject to local zoning for as
long as it is granted to you. With
allocated, you can do it as long as
you are doing a specific function and
only you can do that function.
Application is always more important
than what is said in the legislation,
and whether this is something that
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